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RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF DOMINANCE OF




A continuing problem in criminal law is the tendency of courts and law-
yers to turn over their responsibilities in determining criminal responsi-
bility of defendants to psychiatrists. The courts and psychiatrists seem to
agree that the criminal responsibility decision is a legal, social, and moral
judgment for the jury rather than a medical or scientific question for expert
witnesses. Yet psychiatrists continue to dominate in these determinations.
To a significant extent, this problem can be traced to the standard applied
under the law to determine criminal responsibility. The standards have
varied over judicial history and are recently again coming under review.
Bills submitted to Congress containing proposals to revise and codify the
federal criminal law include recommendations for adoption of a variation
of the American Law Institute test of criminal responsibility.' This test is
also recommended by the National Commission on Reform of Federal Crim-
inal Laws (the Brown Commission) 2 and all United States Courts of
Appeal, with the exception of the First Circuit, have adopted variations of the
ALI test in recent yearsA The administration favors an alternative pro-
posal with a different test.4
The District of Columbia Circuit recently stated that a principal reason
for abandoning the Durham rule5 in favor of the ALI test was to avoid
* A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Georgetown University. Trial Attorney, Crim-
inal Section, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice. The author's opinions
are his own and do not reflect the views of the Justice Department.
IS. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-3C2 (1973); H.R. 10047, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §
503 (1973). The ALI test, set out in the Model Penal Code, is as follows:(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
anti-social conduct.
ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (May 1962 Official Draft).
It should be noted that the test requires that either of two "capacities" be absent.
The "capacity to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct" is referred to
hereinafter as the cognition phase of the test. The "capacity ...to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law" is referred to hereinafter as the volition phase of the
test. The cognition phase requires only a recognition or appreciation, while the volition
phase requires an affirmative action.
2 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, PROPOSED NEW
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, FINAL REPORT § 503 (1971).
3 For an analysis of the important cases in this area, see United States v. Brawner,
471 F.2d 969, 979-81 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
4 The administration proposes a defense to prosecution if "the defendant, as a
result of mental disease or defect, lacked the state of mind required as an element of
the offense charged." S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 502 (1973); H.R. 6046, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 502 (1973).
5 "The rule we now hold . . . is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible
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dominance of psychiatrists on the responsibility issue.6 It is the purpose
of this Article to review this dominance problem and to set forth reasons
why, in fact, it can be expected that the problem will continue under both
the ALI test and the test proposed by the administration.
As an alternative to the bills already submitted, it is recommended that
Congress consider a modernized M'Naghten test of criminal responsibility. 7
Psychiatrists could testify as to the details of any mental disease or defect
and would be allowed to render opinions using the language of that test.
In addition, psychiatrists could testify concerning the existence of a mental
disease or defect. The jury would consider this evidence, along with all
other relevant facts on the issue of whether the defendant in fact lacked the
state of mind required as an element of the offense charged. Psychiatrists,
however, would not be permitted to state opinions in the language of the
state of mind element, since such an opinion would create the opportunity
for even more psychiatric dominance than now exists. Under this proposal
psychiatric testimony and evidence, as distinguished from opinions, would
be admissible on the state of mind element even though the mental dis-
ease or defect might not be serious enough to meet the requirements of the
responsibility test. The government would then, of course, be required to
prove the state of mind element beyond reasonable doubt.
This Article examines the historical development of the dominance of
psychiatrists problem in connection with the various responsibility tests,
and discusses anticipated dominance problems under the administration's
proposed test. It is submitted and will be shown that the proposal set out
in the foregoing paragraph and more fully outlined herein will alleviate the
dominance problem. In addition, this proposal, when joined with other
provisions of the administration's bill,8 could help resolve some of the age-
old complaints of psychiatrists and courts concerning the restrictiveness of
the M'Naghten test. However, this will require that the legislation include
language to ensure that, even though falling short of showing full lack of
responsibility under the modernized M'Naghten test, testimony and evidence
as to the existence of mental disease or defect be allowed in evidence to be
weighed by the jury along with all other relevant facts on the state of mind
element.
The federal courts, have, in recent years, adopted the ALI test, and
if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect." Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (1954).
6 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981-83 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
7 The M'Naghten test requires acquittal if "the party accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know that he
was doing what was wrong." M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng.
Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). I propose a modernization of this language in the form
of the cognition phase of the ALI test, to wit: A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.
8 S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4222 (1973); H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., .1st Sess. §
4222 (1973) (pertaining to hospitalization of persons found not guilty by reason of
insanity); S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4224 (1973); H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 4224 (1973) (pertaining to authority for the sentencing judge to order hospitali-
zation for convicted defendants with mental disorders).
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earlier had combined the irresistible impulse test with M'Naghten.9 Thus,
it might appear to be an exercise in futility to recommend moving back
toward the unadorned M'Naghten test at this time. However, since legisla-
tion is under consideration there is an opportunity to establish safeguards
surrounding M'Naghten which could help resolve many of the problems
which have plagued courts, lawyers, and psychiatrists alike over the years.
These matters together are the focus of this Article.
I. THE PROBLEM OF DOMINANCE OF PSYCHIATRISTS
A. The M'Naghten Test
The M'Naghten test 10 originated in an English case which gave rise to
heated debate at the time it was decided. Evidence that defendant M'Nagh-
ten was insane was given in open court by nine medical witnesses, and the
court almost directed the jury to render a verdict of acquittal." The court
stated to the jury: "I cannot help remarking, in common with my learned
brethren, that the whole of the medical evidence is on one side, and that
there is no part of it which leaves any doubt on the mind. It seems almost
unnecessary that I should go through the evidence."'1 2 The furor over the
acquittal, including the dissatisfaction of Queen Victoria with the adminis-
tration of justice, caused the House of Lords to submit questions to the
judges of England for an authoritative statement of the law. This ultimately
resulted in the M'Naghten test, which has been extensively used in determin-
ing criminal responsibility since that time. Professor Glueck has stated that
Lord Brougham's reason for putting the questions to the assembly of judges
was that their assistance would be invaluable in that:
[I]t would lead to more uniformity in the language they used on future
occasions in charging and directing juries on this most delicate and
important subject. They would no longer indulge in that variety of
phrase which only served to perplex others, if it did not also tend to
bewilder themselves, as he supposed it sometimes did; but they would
use one constant phrase, which the public and all persons concerned
would be able to understand.' 3
Thus, it can be seen that the M'Naghten trial involved a definite element of
"dominance" by the medical witnesses, which resulted in pressure for the
development of an adequate legal framework in which to instruct the jury
in connection with evaluating the medical evidence. In spite of other criti-
cisms of M'Naghten, and regardless of how workable the test may have
been in practice, it appears clear that the reason for developing it was to
establish a framework of law in order to avoid the dominance of psychia-
trists in questions of fact.
The need for such a legal framework continues. It is essential that a
9 See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 975-81 (1972).
10 See note 7 supra.
11 See J. BIGGS, TIhE GUILTY MIND 101 (1955).
12 Id. at 101-02.




jury trying the issue of criminal responsibility be provided "with a verbal tool
by which it can relate the defendant's mental disease to his total personality
and by means of which it can render an ultimate social and moral judg-
ment.'1 4  Without such a framework it is impossible fairly to evaluate
psychiatric testimony under our present system of justice.
B. The Irresistible Impulse Test
The irresistible impulse test, which many courts added to the M'Naghten
test, is that, although a person is able to distinguish right from wrong, he is
not responsible if "his will . . . the governing power of his mind, has been
so completely destroyed that his actions are not subject to it, but are beyond
his control . ... "15 A modernized version of the irresistible impulse test
is incorporated as the volition phase of -the ALI test.' 6 Numerous author-
ities agree that the volition phase of the ALI test is essentially the same as
the old irresistible impulse test except that ALI is wider in scope and
gives more flexibility to psychiatrists in arriving at opinions and juries in
arriving at decisions that persons lack criminal responsibility. 17 Further-
more, it is clear that the irresistible impulse test was designed to broaden
the scope of M'Naghten, catching "in its exculpatory net many persons
with mental aberration whom the knowledge tests miss. .... ,,18
The cases discussing the irresistible impulse test do not specifically use the
language of dominance of psychiatrists in describing problems under the test.19
Those cases which decline to adopt the irresistible impulse test discuss its
problems in terms of vagueness and uncertainty and difficulty in determin-
ing whether the impulse was really irresistible.20 The dominance of the
fact questions which give rise to the many uncertainties in the test, undoubt-
edly afforded the opportunity for psychiatrists to dominate, even though the
cases do not discuss the problem in these terms.
C. The Durham Rule
In 1954 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set
out what has come to be known as the Durham rule of criminal responsibility,
holding that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
was the product of mental disease or mental defect."121 Eighteen years later
the same court in United States v. Brawner22 conducted an extensive review
14 United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 773 (3d Cir. 1961).
15 United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1967).
16 See note 1 supra.
17 See United States v. Parks, 460 F.2d 736, 743-44 (5th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Frazier, 458 F.2d 911, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1972); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d
908, 913-14 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 684-85 (7th
Cir. 1967). See also Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 75 (9th Cir. 1970) (Trask,
J., dissenting).
18 S. GLUECK, supra note 13, at 49-57.
19 Schulman, To Be or Not to Be an Expert, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 57, 62-63.2
oSee, e.g., Judd v. State, 41 Ariz. 176, 183-84, 16 P.2d 720, 723 (1932); People
v. Hoin, 62 Cal. 120 (1882); Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 279 (1879); Flanagan
v. People, 52 N.Y. 467, 470 (1873).
21 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
22 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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of the problem of dominance of psychiatrists under Durham. Both the
majority opinion and the separate opinion of Chief Judge Bazelon, the
author of the Durham rule, noted that the problem involved the use of con-
clusory labels and terms in connection with the key concepts of "product"
and "mental disease or mental defect." In the words of Chief Judge Baze-
Ion:
[I]t quickly became apparent that while our decision produced some
expansion of the inquiry, it did not do nearly enough to eliminate the
experts' stranglehold on the process. Even after Durham counsel for
both sides often sought to present the issue to the jury in 'simplified'
form by eliciting from the experts little more than conclusory yes-or-
no answers to the questions, 'Was the accused suffering from a mental
disease or defect?' 'Was his act the product of that disease or defect?'
And so the experts continued, on the whole, to speak in conclusory
terms which inevitably included but concealed their underlying judg-
ments, and their own views as to the appropriate legal outcome. The
use of conclusory psychiatric labels often provided an aura of certainty
which made it difficult to discern the inadequacies of the examination
on which the expert testimony was based, and the limitations of psy-
chiatric knowledge generally. 23
As Judge Burger pointed out in Blocker v. United States, "The hazards in
allowing experts to testify in precisely or even substantially the terms of
the ultimate issue are apparent. This is a course which, once allowed, risks
the danger that lay jurors, baffled by the intricacies of expert discourse and
unintelligible technical jargon may be tempted to abdicate independent
analysis of the facts on which the opinion rests .... -24
Subsequent developments have not eased the problem under the Durham
rule. Neither the definition of "mental disease or mental defect" in McDonald
v. United States,25 nor the proscription in Washington v. United States20
against psychiatrists testifying as to whether an act was the "product"
of such a disease or defect, has brought an end to psychiatric domin-
ance. 27  Reviewing its own rule in Brawner, the District of Columbia
Circuit was compelled to the conclusion that Durham had opened the flood-
gates for the dominance of psychiatrists, and neither McDonald nor Washing-
ton had been successful in closing them.
D. The ALI Rule
The broadness and flexibility of the ALI rule, as described by the courts
adopting it, 28 is due in part to its reference, like the Durham rule, to a
"mental disease or mental defect," and in part to its requirement of only
partial, as opposed to total, cognitive or volitional incapacity. But broadness
23 Id. at 1011 (Bazelon, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24 288 F.2d 853, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
25 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
26 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
27 See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 978-79, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Pugh, The Insanity Defense in Operation: A Practicing Psychiatrist Views Durham
and Brawner, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 87, 94-96.2 8 See note 3 supra, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 27
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and flexibility notwithstanding, the ALI rule still fosters the same sort of
conclusory testimony that allows psychiatrists to dominate under Durham.
The court stated in Brawner that a psychiatrist could be asked "whether
the mental disease or defect resulted in lack of substantial capacity to con-
trol the behavior in question (or appreciate its wrongfulness) .'29 Other
federal courts also allow psychiatrists to render opinions in terms of the
language of the test. Thus, there is full opportunity for the dominance of
psychiatrists to continue within the wide scope of the ALI test. This is
particularly true as to the volition phase of the test. In his separate opinion
in Brawner, Chief Judge Bazelon opined: "The court's approach may very
well succeed and encourage jurors to look behind the testimony and recom-
mendations of the experts. But, as I have tried to demonstrate above, there
is also a significant possibility that our test will leave the power of the ex-
perts intact-or even make possible an enlargement of their influence."30
The majority in Brawner found no indication in the available literature that
the language of the ALI test is "conducive to a testimonal mystique permit-
ting expert dominance and encroachment on the jury's function."'1  How-
ever, in 1962 Professor Sheldon Glueck stated that the language of the
ALI test is, in fact, conducive to producing that result.32 The volition phase
of the ALI test has also been discussed by Professor David Robinson, con-
sultant on psychiatric defenses to the Brown Commission, who indicated
that the arguments against control tests, including irresistible impulse and
ALI, are that they have a tendency to exculpate too many individuals; that
"determinism seems dominant in the thinking of many expert witnesses;"
that some deterministic views are "consistent with the notion that all criminal
conduct is evidence of lack of power to conform to the requirements of
law;" and that "[p]erhaps the most fundamental objection to the control
tests is their lack of determinate meaning."138 With reference to the ALI
test Professor Robinson further stated:
The key terms are without meaning or extremely vague. A.L.I. is
largely a control test, and subject to metaphysical quandaries as-
sociated with assigning operational meaning. To a determinist, the
abolition of criminal liability appears to be authorized by it; to a non-
determinist it remains indeterminate in scope. 'Mental disease or
defect' and 'substantial capacity to conform' cannot be resolved ex-
cept by utilizing the moral preferences of expert witnesses and triers
of fact.3 4
As Chief Judge Bazelon opined in Brawner, the change from the Durham
test to the ALI test will probably not be an improvement with regard to
the psychiatric dominance question. "In fact, because it describes the ques-
29 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
3o Id. at 1031.
31 Id. at 983.
32 S. GLU EcK, supra note 13, at 65.
33 Robinson, Consultant's Report on Criminal Responsibility-Mental Illness:
Section 503, in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,
WORKING PAPERS 229, 240-42 (1970).
34 ld. at 245.
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tion as one of fact it may lull the jury into the mistaken assumption that
the question of responsibility can best be resolved by experts, leaving the
jury at the mercy of the witness who asserts most persuasively that, in his
expert judgment, the defendant's capacity was or was not substantially im-
paired."35 A review of federal cases tried since adoption of the ALI test
indicates that Chief Judge Bazelon was on target in his statement that the
jury (or court trying the case without a jury) is at the mercy of expert wit-
nesses under ALL. All of the cases show that psychiatric opinions are ren-
dered in the language of the ALI test, giving full opportunity for psychiatrists
to continue to dominate. The cases further illustrate that courts and juries
continue to weigh the responsibility issue to a great extent in terms of what
psychiatrists have the most impressive credentials and are the most effective
witnesses.36
Since the courts allow psychiatrists to render their opinions in the exact
terms of the ALI test, dominance of psychiatrists is particularly a problem
with reference to the volition phase of that test. The "law" includes the
state of mind element of the offense. Thus, for a psychiatrist to render an
opinion as to whether or not a person lacks substantial capacity to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law requires that the psychiatrist
have an intricate knowledge of all of the facts and legal concepts involved
in the state of mind element of the offense. In fact, unless the psychiatrist
has sat through the trial and heard all of the evidence and the court's instruc-
tions on the law (in effect, as a thirteenth juror), he is really not in a posi-
tion to render such an opinion. To some extent, the same thing is true with
the cognition phase of the ALI test. That concept also focuses on the parti-
cular conduct involved in the offense, but may not require as much know-
ledge by the psychiatrist of the intricate legal and factual concepts.
A further point to consider with reference to the volitional phase of
the ALI test is that it is broader and more open to varying interpretations
by psychiatrists than the cognition phase and, thus, is more susceptible to
domination by defense oriented psychiatrists. This is demonstrated by the
fact that in numerous cases a psychiatrist renders an opinion that the person
lacks substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
35 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Further doubt
is cast on the improvement gained in moving from Durham to ALI in Wiehofen,
Detruding the Experts, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 38, 43-49, and in Pugh, supra note 27, at
88-91.
36 United States v. Kohlman, 469 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Huff-
man, 467 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Parks, 460 F.2d 736 (5th Cir.
1972); United States v. Handy, 454 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1040-43 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stewart, 443 F.2d
1129, 1132-35 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hernandez, 438 F.2d 676 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 976 (1971); United States v. O'Neal, 431 F.2d 695 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 917 (1971); United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932, 935
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 949 (1971); United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d
700, 703-05 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 (1970); United States v.
Retolaza, 398 F.2d 235, 240-42 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1032 (1969);
United States v. Levy, 326 F. Supp. 1285, 1289-94 (D. Conn.), af 'd, 449 F.2d 769
(2d Cir. 1971); United States v. McGirr, 320 F. Supp. 1333, 1338-39 (D. Md. 1971).
Of course, these cases do not reflect information as to the number of acquittals, or
decisions against prosecution, resulting from opinions of psychiatrists under the ALI
test; nor do they reflect cases which are not appealed, or in which there is no discussion
of psychiatric testimony in an opinion.
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law but does not lack substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct.37
E. The Case Against Dominance
Doctor Bernard L. Diamond, psychiatrist and professor of criminology
and law at the University of California, has recently stated that psychiatrists
are unable effectively to perform the task of differentiating "the mentally
ill offender who committed his crime as a result of his psychopathology
from the mentally sound offender who committed his crime for more normal
reasons such as greed, passion or other evil intent. ' 38 Further, he has stated
that the expert has difficulty communicating "the basis for this differentia-
tion with sufficient clarity to permit the trier of fact to make a rational de-
cision, fully taking into consideration the psychiatric evidence, yet not blindly
submitting to the authority of the expert."39  He has stated that these
problems exist under the Durham test, and he predicts that the psychiatrist
is not going to do any better under any variant of the ALI test.40
The problems mentioned by Doctor Diamond arise from -the fact that it
is recognized that there is a lack of scientific foundation in psychiatry in
the area of criminal responsibility. 41 Psychiatrists are treatment oriented,42
and many of them have had deterministic training.43 For all these reasons,
among others, it is clear that psychiatrists should not dominate in criminal
responsibility decisions.
Over the years psychiatrists themselves have complained that they should
not give their opinions in the language of the legal responsibility tests be-
cause there is no scientific answer to the criminal responsibility question,
and psychiatrists do not feel they should make legal, social, and moral judg-
ments. 44  Doctor Karl Menninger has stated that "I oppose courtroom ap-
pearances because I consider guilt, competence, and responsibility to be
moral questions, not medical ones . . . . 4 Doctor Manfred Guttmacher
37 United States v. Kohlman, 469 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Parks,
460 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Stewart, 443 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir.
1971); United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
949 (1971); United States v, Levy, 326 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 449 F.2d
769 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. McGirr, 320 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Md. 1971).




41 See H. GouLETr, THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 7-16 (1965);
J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 466-72 (2d ed. 1960); Diamond,
supra note 38, at 111-15.
42 See Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1967); S. GLUECK,
supra note 13, at 8; Diamond, supra note 38, at 116.
43 See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United
States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 929 (4th Cir. 1968); H. GOULETT, supra note 41,
at 22-23.4 4 See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1010-11, 1014-15 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); M. GUTTMACI-ER, THE ROLE
OF PSYCHIATRY IN LAW 77 (1968); P. ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND 172-74 (1958);
A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 297-300, 305 (1968); Suarez, A Critique of the
Psychiatrist's Role as Expert Witness, 12 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 172, 174-75(1967). See also K. MENNINOER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 133-40 (1968).
45 K. MENNINGER, supra note 44, at 139.
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has said that "[s]ince we, as psychiatrists, know that responsibility is not
something inherent within the individual, which we as professionals can
measure, but is a social judgment, we feel that it is best carried out by the
jury that represents the community. ' 46  Courts are unanimous in holding
that psychiatrists should not dominate in criminal responsibility decisions. 47
Undoubtedly, the reasons for this include the lack of scientific foundation,
treatment orientation, and deterministic elements discussed above.
II. POTENTIAL DOMINANCE PROBLEMS UNDER THE
ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL
Section 502 of the administration's bill48 is subject to the same problems
of psychiatric dominance which have been outlined heretofore. The language
of section 502 parallels the language in Brawner and numerous other au-
thorities to the effect that mental disease or defect, although not serious
enough to exonerate under the responsibility test, may be considered by the
jury on the state of mind element. 49  Thus, it can be expected that under
section 502 many psychiatrists, under the guidance of defense attorneys,
will attempt to render opinions in the language of the state of mind element
so that even the most minor mental disease or defect will eliminate the state
of mind required for conviction. Even in varying circumstances under exist-
ing law, such attempts have been made, 50 and section 502 is an open invita-
tion for more of the same. In this connection Professor John Monahan has
recently commented on an approach suggested by Professor Norval Morris
that evidence of mental illness should be admitted as to the presence or
absence of mens rea and that there should be no other insanity defense.
"Menninger has stated that 'the time will come when stealing or murder will
be thought of as a symptom, indicating the presence of a disease.' To the
extent that this occurs, Morris' rule would result in the elimination of all
criminal sanctioning."' 51 In essence, this is the concept involved in sec-
tion 502.
It is because of this trend, as well as for reasons previously stated, that
it can be expected that section 502 will cause more rather than less use of
mental illness as a defense. For this reason it seems clear that section 502
would not eliminate the battle of psychiatrists or cut down on personnel in-
volved in handling mental illness defenses in connection with criminal trials.
The arena would merely be shifted from a traditional responsibility test to
the mens rea concept.6 2  Professor Alan M. Dershowitz has recognized that
4 6 M. GUTTMACHER, supra note 44, at 77.
47 See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981-83 (D.C, Cir. 1972); United
States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 619-20 (2d Cir. 1966).
48 See note 4 supra.
49 471 F.2d at 998-1002.
50 See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228-62 (1968). See also United States v.
Haseltine, 419 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1969).
51 Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 719, 728
(1973). See also Goldstein, The Brawner Rule-Why? Or No More Nonsense on Non
Sense in the Criminal Law, Please!, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 126, 135-36.
52 Goldstein, supra note 51, at 134-36; Monahan, supra note 51, at 728; Weihofen,
supra note 35, at 42 n.17. Chief Justice Burger has been quoted as being in favor
of abolishing the insanity defense. It should be noted, however, that in his comment
[Vol. 27
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section 502 may cause more rather than less use of mental illness as a defense.
He recently observed:
One irony of the Nixon proposal, pointed out by some observers, is
that it may actually increase the number of cases in which evidence of
mental illness is sought to be introduced by defendants. Today, with
the insanity defense available, many courts refuse to allow psychiatric
testimony on the issue of intent, limiting it exclusively to whether the
defendant knew the difference between right and wrong (or met what-
ever other insanity test happens to prevail in the particular jurisdiction).
Under the Nixon proposal, however, psychiatric evidence would be ad-
missible to show, in the words of the bill, that the defendant 'lacked the
state of mind required as an element of the offense charged.' Thus,
the courts may soon hear psychiatrists explaining that an alleged tax
evader, while not insane, could not have formed the 'intent' to defraud
because he had a compulsion to cheat.5a
My recommendation differs from section 502 in two major respects.
In the first place, although my proposal and section 502 are essentially the
same with regard to the admissibility of evidence as to the state of mind
of the defendant, my proposal includes a modernized statement of the
M'Naghten test. This test provides a legal framework for the evaluation
of psychiatric testimony.
Second, my proposal, as distinct from section 502, would allow no opinions
of psychiatrists framed in the language of the state of mind elements. The
situation under section 502 would be different. Rule 704 of the proposed
federal rules of evidence states: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." 54  When rule 704 goes
into effect, and if section 502 becomes law, it can be expected that the courts
will allow opinions of psychiatrists in the exact language of the state of mind
elements of the various offenses. The reason for this is that section 502
would be the responsibility test. On the other hand, if modernized M'Naghten
is the responsibility test, psychiatric opinions directly on the state of mind
element should not be admissible under rule 704 because such opinions
could only be in terms of the responsibility test and would not be "other-
wise admissible." If the proposals herein are adopted, this should be made
clear in the legislation.
at a conference of judges he merely referred to that as a hypothetical possibility in the
context of a full treatment and rehabilitation system, and said that the only determina-
tion at the trial would be whether the defendant did the act "which would constitute
a crime if he had the mens rea, the criminal intent." Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d
420, 428-29 n.10 (10th Cir. 1963). From this it cannot be said that Chief Justice
Burger favors abolishing the insanity defense and allowing psychiatric evidence on
only mens rea at the trial. Furthermore, Judges Bazelon, Haynesworth, and Weintraub
have not taken such a position either, according to authority cited in note 19 supra.
United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Abolishing the insanity
defense and not allowing evidence of mental disease or defect on mens rea may create
constitutional problems. See Monahan, supra note 51, at 727; Robinson, supra note
33, at 252.
53 Dershowitz, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: The Most Significant Feature of
the Administration's Proposed Criminal Code-An Essay, 9 CRiM. L. BULL. 434, 438
(1973).
54 Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 704, 34
L. Ed. 2d cxlvii (1972).
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If section 502 became law, its application to many of the offenses in the
new federal criminal code would obtain the same result as the application
of M'Naghten. This would occur with regard to offenses using the words
"knowingly" or "with knowledge" as the mental element, since the defi-
nition of those words in the administration's bill is a state of mind of the
defendant "when he is aware of the nature of his conduct."' ' 5 As to the other
offenses in the new code with state of mind elements couched in terms
of "intent," "recklessness," or "negligence," however, the result obtained by
application of section 502, unlike that under M'Naghten, would be built
upon the unfettered opinions of psychiatrists. 50  And even under the other
types of offenses section 502 would allow psychiatrists to involve them-
selves deeply in opinions directed toward ,the intricate legal and factual issues
involved in the state of mind elements. This would not be the case were
M'Naghten applied as outlined below.
III. PROPOSAL
I recommend that Congress consider adopting a modernized M'Naghten
test of criminal responsibility. This should be in the language of the cogni-
tion phase of the ALI test to the effect that "a person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease
or defect he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct." This is broader than the original M'Naghten test.57 It does not
constitute a step backward in the law, since even though the federal courts
have moved from M'Naghten to ALI, numerous state courts have retained
M'Naghten.58
The reason for recommending adoption of modernized M'Naghten is to
help reduce dominance of psychiatrists. However, to allay any remaining
fears that this may be a backward movement, certain additional provisions
should be included in the legislation to resolve the criticisms of M'Naghten.
One of these criticisms is that the "language of the old right-wrong/irresistible
impulse rule for insanity was antiquated, no longer reflecting the commun-
ity's judgment as to who ought to be held criminally liable for socially
destructive acts . . ."59 and did not "comport with modem medical knowl-
edge that an individual is a mentally complex being with varying degrees of
awareness." 60  More specifically, M'Naghten has been criticized because of
its emphasis on the cognitive aspect of the personality which recognizes no
degrees of crime."' Psychiatrists were also concerned that under M'Naghten
and other traditional tests the law asked them to go beyond their profes-
55 S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(b) (1973); H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 302(b) (1973).
56Id. §§ 301, 302, 303.
57 See note 7 supra.
58 See Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 82-83 (9th Cir. 1970) (Trask, J.,
dissenting).
59 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1972).60 Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 66 (9th Cir. 1970).
61 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 618 (2d Cir. 1966). See also United
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Frazier,
458 F.2d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 1972).
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sional competence and decide "which defendants were guilty and which ones
should be excused for lack of criminal responsibility. '6 2  Some courts have
emphasized that individuals held responsible under M'Naghten may be sent
to prison, not treated for existing mental disease, and, upon release, be a
danger to society.6 3 Other courts have said that M'Naghten placed tight
shackles upon expert testimony of psychiatrists, depriving the triers of fact
of information vital to their judgment.6 4
I recommend that Congress include in the legislation an authorization for
psychiatrists to testify, and for evidence to be presented, concerning the exist-
ence of a mental disease or defect, to be considered by the jury along with
other relevant facts on the issue of whether or not the defendant in fact lacked
the state of mind required as an element of the offense charged. This is now
authorized in the District of Columbia and other jurisdictions in varying
situations. 65 This concept of testimony as to mental disease or defect which
may affect the state of mind required for the crime has been described in
a variety of ways in various contexts, but it is intended herein that it en-
compass terms such as diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, partial
insanity or partial responsibility reducing the degree of the offense, and
the volition phase of ALL. 66
Procedurally, the issue involved may arise in situations where the mental
condition is offered as a defense under the responsibility test but the jury
finds that the defendant is responsible under the test. In such a case,
the psychiatric testimony and evidence of the existence of mental
disease or defect may be considered on the question as to whether the de-
fendant in fact had the requisite state of mind required as an element of the
offense. Similarly, such testimony and evidence may be considered directly
on the state of mind element if a full lack of responsibility defense under the
legal test is not raised, or if it is held that there is insufficient evidence for
an instruction under the responsibility test.67 As stated in section 4.02(1)
62 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d
751, 767 (3d Cir. 1961).
63 Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 66-67 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v,
Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d
606, 618 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 767 (3d Cir. 1961).
64 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 619-20 (2d Cir. 1966).
65 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998-1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972).66 See Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228-62 (1968). See also United States v. Alexander,
471 F.2d 923, 947-52 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting); United States v.
Porter, 431 F.2d 7, 9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970); United States v.
Gorman, 393 F.2d 209, 211 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 832 (1968); Brubaker v.
Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 38 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963); Rhodes v.
United States, 282 F.2d 59 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 912 (1960); United States
v. Chappell, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 236, 41 C.M.R. 236 (1970); United States v. Storey, 9
U.S.C.M.A. 162, 25 C.M.R. 424 (1958); State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193(1965); State v. Di Paolo, 34 N.J. 279, 294, 168 A.2d 401, 408 (1961); ALI MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (May 1962 Official Draft); 1 E. DEvITr & C. BLACKMAR,
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 13.17 (2d ed. 1970); H. WIEHOFEN,
MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 174-95 (1954); Goldstein, supra note
51, at 134-44; Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE
L.J. 853 (1963); Manson, Lack of Mental Capacity To intend-A Unique Rule, 4
MILITARY L. REV. 79 (1959).
67 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v.
Gorman, 393 F.2d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1968).
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of the Model Penal Code, "Evidence that the defendant suffered from a men-
tal disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the
defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an element of the
offense." 68
Certainly the concept described in the foregoing paragraphs should be
applicable to crimes with specific intent. So in homicide cases it should
apply to premeditation, deliberation and malice, even though the authorities
are divided as to malice.6 9  With specific reference to the administration's
proposed bill, the concept should apply to offenses involving the culpability
requirements described as intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negli-
gently.70 Furthermore, the concept should not only have the effect of re-
ducing the degree of crime where degrees are involved, but as a factor to be
weighed along with other evidence as to whether the state of mind element
existed, it should have the effect of contributing to complete acquittal if the
jury is so inclined. In addition, if a non-degree crime is involved the con-
cept should be available for consideration by the jury so it can contribute
to complete acquittal. 7'
The concept under consideration allows psychiatric testimony and evi-
dence as to the existence of a mental disease or defect, to be considered along
with other relevant facts on the issue of whether the defendant lacked the
state of mind required as an element of the offense charged. Thus, although
social and cultural factors may be considered by a psychiatrist in connection
with other factors as to whether, in fact, there is a mental disease or defect,
such social and cultural factors standing alone should not be considered admis-
sible under this concept. 72 It is also noted that there is a split in the federal cir-
cuits as to the adoption of the so-called ALI caveat paragraph that excludes
from the terms "mental disease or defect" an "abnormality manifested only
by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct. '78 Of course, if such
repeated activity is all that is involved, then it does not meet the requirements
of "mental disease or defect" in the concept under consideration here. How-
ever, there may be other evidence "augmenting mere recidivism" which
could result in a diagnosis of a mental disease. 74
With reference to burden of proof, it is contemplated that where there
is a full insanity defense, once some evidence of mental disease or defect
has been introduced, the presumption of sanity no longer controls and the
government must prove sanity beyond reasonable doubt in terms of modern-
ized M'Naghten. The jury would be instructed that it is authorized to bring
in a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, if warranted by the evidence. 75
However, the jury should also be instructed that even if there is a decision
68 ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (May 1962 Official Draft).
69 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 985, 998, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1238-42, 1246-57 (1968).
70S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301-03 (1973); H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. §§ 301-03 (1973).
7' Cf. United States v. Gorman, 393 F.2d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1968).
72 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 994-95 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
7s Id. at 992-93.
74 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 625 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Wade v.
United States, 426 F.2d 64, 72-73 (9th Cir. 1970).
75 Cf. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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that the evidence is not sufficient for a verdict of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity, the evidence of mental disease or defect may also be considered on
whether the government has proved the state of mind element beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.7 6 If the government does not prove the state of mind element
beyond a reasonable doubt, a full acquittal would result rather than an ac-
quittal by reason of insanity. 77  The defendant should also be authorized
to present psychiatric testimony and evidence directly on the state of mind
element, without raising a full insanity defense, in which case the jury would
be instructed to consider it in terms of whether the government had proved
that element beyond a reasonable doubt.78
Under the various responsibility tests there have been many complaints
by psychiatrists that the tests do not reflect modern medical knowledge, that
yes or no answers have been demanded in the language of the tests, and that
psychiatric testimony is, therefore, artificially limited and distorted.79 As the
foregoing discussion indicates, under the proposals set forth herein this should
no longer be a problem. These proposals go further than courts which have
earlier attempted to resolve this problem by merely allowing broad psychiat-
ric testimony.80 In this connection, a significant problem has been that
many courts have not allowed instructions to be given to juries drawing at-
tention to psychiatric testimony already in evidence concerning its effect on
the state of mind element, if such testimony is not sufficient to exonerate
under the responsibility test.8 ' Even more significant is the fact that some
courts have not allowed such testimony to be admitted in evidence if it
does not meet the standards of the responsibility test.8 2  Within the frame-
work previously discussed such evidence would be admitted under the pro-
posals herein, and there would be an instruction to the jury to consider it
on the state of mind element. It is recommended that this be made clear
by Congress in the legislation.
The concept under consideration would result in admissibility of psychiat-
ric testimony and evidence which would encompass what has been called
diminished capacity, diminished responsibility and partial insanity or partial
responsibility. In fact, it would go even further than some courts in that
it would authorize complete acquittal, under appropriate circumstances,
rather than merely reducing the degree of the offense.83
Admissibility of psychiatric testimony and evidence as to the existence of
76 Id. See also 1 E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 66, at § 13.17.
77 1 E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 66, at § 13.17.
78 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
79 S. GLUECK, supra note 13, at 61-65. See also notes 59, 60, and 61 supra, and
accompanying text.
80 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 994-95 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States
v. Frazier, 458 F.2d 911, 915-16 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d
920, 925 (4th Cir. 1968).
81 Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228, 1260 (1968). See also United States v. Alexander,
471 F.2d 923, 951-52 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), referring to Fisher
v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946) and Stewart v. United States, 275 F.2d 617
(D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 366 U.S. 1 (1961).
82 Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228, 1235-38 (1968). See United States v. Haseltine,
419 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1969).
83 Cf. Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228, 1235-43 (1968); S. GLUECK, supra note 13, at
22-30. See also note 64 supra, and accompanying text.
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mental disease or defect affecting the state of mind element would also en-
compass what is involved in the irresistible impulse test (and the modem
verson of that test which is the volitional phase of ALI). In order to broaden
M'Naghten to include a volitional concept there is no need for an addition to
the responsibility test. The problem would be resolved by allowing the jury
to consider the psychiatric testimony and evidence in the framework pre-
viously discussed. The only difference is that the jury would consider the
testimony and evidence, along with other evidence, in determining whether
the state of mind element had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, rather
than considering the volitional concepts in terms of a full responsibility test.
Such consideration by the jury should be adequate, and would answer the
long existing complaints of psychiatrists, courts, and other authorities on
this subject. s4
The administration's proposed bill includes a section providing hospitaliza-
tion for a person acquitted by reason of insanity,"5 and a section providing
that the sentencing court may commit the defendant to the custody of the
Attorney General for treatment in a suitable mental hospital or other facility
if a convicted defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or
defect as a result of which he is in need of custody, care, or treatment in
a mental institution.86 The provision for hospitalization for those acquitted
by reason of insanity fills in a gap which has been recognized by the courts.87
Authority for the sentencing court to order treatment in a mental institution
for convicted defendants having a mental disease or defect resolves the prob-
lem, recognized by the courts, that a person might not be treated in prison
and could be released while still a danger to society. 88
With reference to dominance, the major problem under Durham appears
to have been opinions of psychiatrists in the language of the responsibility
test. This problem will continue under ALL. As stated earlier, dominance
of psychiatrists under the volitional phase of the ALI test is particularly
troublesome because of the wide-open nature of that phase of the test, giv-
ing psychiatrists much more leeway to dominate than under modernized
M'Naghten. For purposes of a standard or framework in which to evaluate
psychiatric testimony and evidence a responsibility test is necessary. Modern-
ized M'Naghten is recommended since it is the least susceptible of causing
domination by psychiatrists. It is also clear that because the volitional phase
84 Cf. GLUECK, supra note 13, at 54-58; Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense
in the Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 956, 991-93 (1952). See also note 64 supra,
and accompanying text.
85S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4222 (1973); H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 4222 (1973).
86S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4224 (1973); H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 4224 (1973).
87 United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 686-87 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d
606, 625-26 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 80-82 (9th
Cir. 1970) (Trask, J., dissenting).88 See note 63 supra, and accompanying text. See also S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 4225 (1973); H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4225 (1973). These sections
provide for examination and further commitment if, at the expiration of the sentence,




of ALI requires psychiatrists to go into whether the defendant can conform
to the requirements of the "law," including particularly the state of mind
element, psychiatrists would be more involved in legal, social, and moral
questions than under modernized M'Naghten. Thus, psychiatrists should
welcome the opportunity to avoid rendering opinions in -the language of
the volitional phase of ALI.
It is true that under the recommendations herein it is contemplated that
psychiatrists will still be authorized to render opinions in the language of
modernized M'Naghten. This is consistent with the position taken by the
court in Brawner to the effect that with reference to the responsibility test
"itlhe goal of avoiding undue dominance of the jury by expert testimony
does not require ostrich disregard of the key issue of causality." 89 Thus, in
Brawner the court held that a psychiatrist could be asked for an opinion in
terms of the full ALI test,90 and similarly under the proposals herein psychia-
trists would be authorized to render opinions in the language of the cognition
phase of ALI (modernized M'Naghten).
Because of potential continued dominance of psychiatrists there are some
who question whether there should be opinions in the language of the re-
sponsibility test.91 However, the opportunity for dominance will be re-
duced by not allowing psychiatrists to render opinions on the volitional phases.
The jury will still have the benefit of psychiatric testimony and evidence as
to existence of mental disease or defect and will be given instructions by the
court on this in connection with the state of mind element.
Since modernized M'Naghten is a legal, not a medical concept, and psy-
chiatrists will be able to fully present their testimony and have it considered
in the framework outlined herein, it does not appear that they should have
difficulties about being asked to render an opinion in terms of modernized
M'Naghten.92 If, in fact, they have a problem in rendering such an opinion
they can say so, and their testimony will still be considered by the jury.
All of the points, previously discussed, as to other wide-open tests such
as Durham and the volitional phase of ALI are fully applicable as to why
there should be no psychiatric opinions in the language of the state of mind
element. This applies not only to opinions as to whether or not the defend-
ant had the requisite state of mind for the offense, but also as to whether
or not he had the mental capacity for such state of mind. It is recommended
that Congress make clear in the legislation that there should be no such
opinions. Otherwise, the dominance problem would be far worse than it
is now, since there would be no framework whatsoever in which the court
and jury could evaluate these opinions except the language of -the statutes
defining the offenses.
89 471 F.2d 969, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
90 ld. at 1006-07.
91 Id. at 1011-12, 1034 (Bazelon, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92 Cf. H. FINGARETrE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 117-20 (1972); Hall,
Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761, 782-85 (1956).
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